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The nancial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selec-
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nancial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroe-
conomic models of nancial imperfections, however, which have focused almost
exclusively on the eects of limited pledgeability. In this paper, we ll this gap
by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection. Our main results
are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection: (i) leads to
an increase in the economy's equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a
negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium
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nancial integration, we show how this translates into ex-
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In recent years, two important developments have spurred renewed interest
in the macroeconomic eects of nancial frictions: global imbalances and the
nancial crisis of 2007-08. In the case of global imbalances, nancial frictions
have been invoked to account for the large and persistent capital ows from
Asia to the United States and other developed economies (e.g. Caballero et al.
2008). According to this explanation, the ultimate reason behind these capital
ows is that { being subject to nancial frictions { Asian nancial markets have
been unable to supply the assets required to channel their high savings towards
productive investment. Hence, these savings have owed to developed nancial
markets in which these assets could be supplied. In the case of the nancial crisis
of 2007-08, nancial frictions have also been invoked to explain the run-up to
the crisis and the unfolding of events during the crisis itself (e.g. Bernanke 2009,
Brunnermeier 2009). In most of these explanations, however, nancial frictions
are cast in an entirely dierent light: instead of constraining the supply of
assets, thereby limiting the amount of resources that can be channeled towards
productive investment, they are portrayed as the source of an excessive supply of
assets that has channeled too many resources towards unproductive investment.
How can these conicting views of nancial frictions be reconciled with one
another? To answer this question, we must begin by acknowledging that each
of these views has a dierent type of friction in mind. On the one hand, un-
derprovision of assets and limited investment are typically attributed to limited
pledgeability. This friction arises when the enforcement of contracts is imper-
fect, in the sense that there are limits to the resources that creditors can seize
from debtors in the event of default. On the other hand, overprovision of assets
is typically attributed to some form of asymmetric information regarding the
quality of borrowers, which fuels investment by unproductive or inecient in-
dividuals. This friction leads to adverse selection, in the sense that it provides
incentives for relatively inecient individuals to invest. Since markets in the
real world are jointly characterized by some measure of limited pledgeability
and some degree of adverse selection, both views are useful to understand re-
ality. But how do they interact with one another? How does adverse selection
aect the size and direction of capital ows in the presence of pledgeability con-
straints? How do these capital ows in turn aect the ineciencies associated
to adverse selection? Answering these questions is essential to understand re-
cent events. Yet they cannot be addressed with existing macroeconomic models,
which focus mostly on limited pledgeability while neglecting adverse selection.
To address them, we need a stylized model that brings adverse selection to the
foreground.
The goal of this paper is to provide such a model. In particular, we de-
velop a standard growth model in which credit markets intermediate resources
between savers and investors in capital accumulation. Individuals are endowed
with some resources and an investment project for producing capital, and they
2must decide whether: (i) to undertake their project and become entrepreneurs,
in which case they demand funds from credit markets, or; (ii) to forego their
project and become savers, in which case they supply their resources to credit
markets. Crucially, it is assumed that the quality of investment opportuni-
ties diers across individuals, so that it is in principle desirable for the most
productive among them to become entrepreneurs and for the least productive
among them to become savers. To give adverse selection a central role in credit
markets, however, we also assume that an individual's productivity is private
information and thus unobservable by lenders. What are the main consequences
of this assumption for macroeconomic outcomes?
The rst-order implication of adverse selection is that, by preventing lenders
from distinguishing among dierent types of borrowers, it induces cross-subsidization
between high- and low-productivity entrepreneurs. The reason for this is simple.
Precisely because lenders cannot observe individual productivity, all borrowers
must pay the same contractual interest rate in equilibrium. This implies that
high-productivity entrepreneurs, who repay often, eectively face a higher cost
of funds than low-productivity entrepreneurs, who repay only seldom. It is this
feature that gives rise to adverse selection by providing some low-productivity
individuals, who would be savers in the absence of cross-subsidization, with
incentives to become entrepreneurs. There are thus two clear macroeconomic
implications of adverse selection: (i) by boosting equilibrium borrowing and
investment, it leads to an increase in the economy's equilibrium interest rate,
and; (ii) by fostering inecient entrepreneurship, it generates a negative wedge
between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate.
We show that both of these implications have important consequences for
capital ows when we allow the economy to borrow from and/or lend to the in-
ternational nancial market. First, through its eect on the equilibrium interest
rate, adverse selection induces the economy to attract more capital ows than it
otherwise would: relative to the full-information economy, then, the presence of
adverse selection boosts net capital inows from the international nancial mar-
ket. In particular, since the marginal return to investment lies below the world
interest rate, these capital inows can lead to a fall in aggregate consumption.
Second, since the extent to which it distorts individual incentives depends on
the state of the economy, adverse selection exacerbates the volatility of capital
ows, capital accumulation and output.
This last point warrants some discussion. In our economy, for a given inter-
est rate, the incentives of less productive individuals to become entrepreneurs
are strongest when the capital stock and income are low: it is precisely in this
case that they are most heavily cross-subsidized by productive entrepreneurs,
since a substantial fraction of investment needs to be nanced through borrow-
ing. Under these conditions, then, adverse selection exerts a strong boost on
investment, capital accumulation and capital inows. As the economy's capital
stock and income increase, however, the extent of cross-subsidization decreases:
individuals become wealthier, an increasing fraction of their investment must be
nanced with their own resources and entrepreneurship loses its appeal for less
productive individuals. Economic growth therefore softens the overinvestment
3induced by adverse selection and its impact on investment, capital accumulation
and capital inows languishes. We show how, through this mechanism, adverse
selection generates endogenous boom-bust cycles in which capital inows fuel
periods of positive capital accumulation and high growth that are followed by
periods negative capital accumulation and economic contraction.
A rst contribution of our paper is thus to develop a stylized dynamic model
to characterize the macroeconomic eects of adverse selection. And these ef-
fects turn out to be the exact opposite of the ones stressed in the literature for
the case of limited pledgeability. The latter is the standard friction in exist-
ing models, which assume that borrowers are capable of diverting part of the
project's proceeds and this places a limit on the resources that creditors can
appropriate in the event of a default. There are two clear macroeconomic im-
plications that are recurrent in the literature: (i) by constraining equilibrium
borrowing and investment, limited pledgeability leads to a decrease in the econ-
omy's equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) by preventing ecient investment from
being undertaken, limited pledgeability generates a positive wedge between the
marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Clearly, the
contrast between these implications of limited pledgeability and our ndings for
the case of adverse selection extend to the open economy as well. Our results
thus complement the existing literature and provide a more accurate picture of
the relationship between nancial frictions and the macroeconomy.
Real-world credit markets are not characterized solely by adverse selection
or by limited pledgeability, however, but rather by a mixture of the two. In
this sense, the benchmark models discussed above are particular cases of a more
general framework in which both frictions coexist. A second contribution of our
paper is to build such a framework by introducing limited pledgeability into our
baseline model of adverse selection. Intuition might suggest that, if one friction
tends to boost investment while the other one tends to constrain it, both of
them should somehow oset one another. We nd however that there is a sense
in which limited pledgeability and adverse selection exacerbate one another so
that, if anything, the inclusion of the former makes the consequences of the
latter more severe.
The reason for this \complementarity" between the two frictions is intuitive.
Binding pledgeability constraints reduce investment and lower the equilibrium
interest rate; but a low interest rate decreases the returns to savings and induces
unproductive individuals to become entrepreneurs, exacerbating adverse selec-
tion. The ultimate result is the combination of a low interest rate and a large
and relatively unproductive pool of potential borrowers, which in our setting
requires rationing to attain market-clearing. The interaction of both frictions is
therefore more harmful than either one of them on its own, which either boosts
or constrains total investment but does not aect the order in which projects
are nanced. The combination of both frictions instead does, so that { for each
given level of investment { the average productivity of nanced projects falls.
The reason is that, due to credit rationing, those projects actually nanced are
randomly selected out of a larger pool of potential borrowers.
Our paper is related to the large body of research that studies the macroe-
4conomic eects of nancial frictions. This literature, which goes back to the
contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
stresses the role of borrowing constraints for macroeconomic outcomes. Of this
literature, we are closest in interest and focus to the branch that has extended
the analysis to open economies, studying the eects of contracting frictions on
the direction and magnitude of capital ows. Most of these papers illustrate how
contracting frictions, such as limits to investor protection, can restrict an econ-
omy's ability to borrow from the international nancial market, thereby gen-
erating capital outows even in capital-scarce or high-productivity economies.
Gertler and Rogo (1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), Matsuyama (2004) and
Aoki et al. (2009) fall within this category. Castro et al. (2004) study how
the gains from improving investor protection are aected by nancial openness.
Similar models have been used recently to account for global imbalances. In
Caballero et al. (2008), for example, high-growing developing economies may
experience capital outows due to pledgeability constraints that restrict their
supply of nancial assets.3 In Mendoza et al. (2007), it is instead the lack of
insurance markets in developing economies that fosters precautionary savings
and the consequent capital outows.4 To the best of our knowledge, however,
we are the rst to analyze the implications of adverse selection for international
capital ows as well as its interaction with pledgeability constraints.5
In its modeling of asymmetric information, our paper is related to the work
on adverse selection by Bester (1985, 1987), DeMeza and Webb (1987), and
Besanko and Thakor (1987). Of these, our model is closest to DeMeza and
Webb (1987), in which adverse selection also fosters overinvestment. In the
implications of adverse selection for volatility our model is related to Martin
(2008), who also shows how this type of friction can give rise to endogenous
cycles.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup. Sec-
tion 3 studies the dynamics of the closed economy when credit markets are
characterized by adverse selection and it extends these results to the inclusion
of limited pledgeability. Section 4 studies the dynamics of the economy under
3Ferraris and Minetti (2007) consider economies where foreign lenders do not just supply
savings but also bring their own \liquidation" technology to the domestic market. In the
interpretation adopted here and in most of the papers mentioned above, the \liquidation"
technology is instead considered to be specic to the country of the borrower, capturing the
institutional features that govern transactions among all agents operating in that economy.
4In a somewhat related vein, Castro et al. (2009) show how weak investor rights might
generate underinvestment in the relatively risky production of capital goods thereby reducing
output in steady state
5Mankiw (1986) shows that asymmetric information can disrupt the functioning of credit
markets. Dierently from him, adverse selection in our model interacts with limited pledgeabil-
ity in a dynamic setting, both under nancial autarky and international nancial integration.
6In this regard, our paper is also related to the endogenous cycle literature, albeit less
directly. Martin (2008) provides a brief discussion of this literature. Of these papers, perhaps
the ones closest to ours are Reichlin and Siconol (2004) and Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee
(2004), the last of which stresses the link between nancial frictions and volatility in small-
open economies.
5nancial integration, doing it rst for the case of pure adverse selection and
then extending these results to the inclusion of limited pledgeability. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. Basic setup
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of young and
old, all with size one. We use Jt to denote the set of individuals born at time
t. Time starts at t = 0 and then goes on forever. All generations maximize the
expected consumption when old so that Ut = Etct+1; where Ut and ct+1 are the
welfare and the old-age consumption of generation t.
The output of the economy is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
of labor and capital: yt = F (lt;kt) = l
1 
t  k
t with  2 (0;1), and lt and kt
are the economy's labor force and capital stock, respectively. All generations
have one unit of labor which they supply inelastically when they are young, i.e.
lt = 1. The stock of capital in period t + 1 is produced through the investment
made by generation t during its youth.7 In order to ensure that nancial markets
have an important role to play, we assume that individuals dier in their ability
to produce capital.
In particular, individuals in each generation are indexed by j 2 Jt and they
are uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Each of them is endowed with
an investment project of xed size, which requires I units of output at time t.
The project of individual j 2 Jt succeeds with probability pj = j 2 [0;1], in
which case it delivers A  I units of capital in period t + 1. With probability
1   pj, the project of individual j 2 Jt fails and it delivers nothing.
In this setting, the capital stock at t + 1 depends not only on the total
investment made in period t, but also on the productivity of such investment.
In particular, if we let At denote the average productivity of investment in
period t, we can write the law of motion of capital as:
kt+1 = At  st  k
t , (1)
where st is the investment rate, i.e. the fraction of output that is devoted to
capital formation.8 Markets are competitive and factors of production are paid
the value of their marginal product:
wt = w(kt) = (1   )  k
t and qt =   k
 1
t , (2)
where wt and qt are the wage and the rental rate of capital, respectively.
7We assume that that capital fully depreciates in production. We also assume that the
rst generation found some positive amount of capital to work with, i.e. k0 > 0.
8At denotes the average units of capital produced per each unit invested by the economy's
entrepreneurs. Note that At ultimately depends on the expected probability of success among
those projects that are undertaken in period t.
6To solve the model, we need to nd the investment rate and the expected
productivity of investment. In our economy the investment rate is straightfor-
ward: the old do not save and the young save all their income. What do the
young do with their savings? As a group, they can only use them to build capi-
tal. This means that the investment rate equals the savings of the young. Since
the latter equal labor income, which is a constant fraction 1    of output, the
investment rate is constant as in the classic Solow (1956) model:
st = 1   . (3)
For a given initial capital stock k0 > 0, a competitive equilibrium of our
economy is thus a sequence fktg
1
t=0 satisfying Equations (1) and (3). A full
characterization of such an equilibrium clearly requires an understanding of
the way in which At is determined: this depends on the workings of credit
markets, which intermediate resources among the young in each generation.
To save for old age, each young individual must choose between (i) becoming
an entrepreneur and undertaking an investment project, which requires credit
whenever I > wt, and; (ii) lending his wage to others in exchange for an inter-
est payment. We assume that all such borrowing and lending is intermediated
through banks. Banks are nite in number, risk neutral and competitive. They
act as intermediaries that collect deposits from individuals and oer loan con-
tracts to active entrepreneurs. On the deposit side, they take the gross interest
factor on deposits rt+1 as given and they compete on the loan market by de-
signing contracts that take the following form:
Denition 1. Entrepreneurs and banks sign a contract dened by the triple
(Lt;Rt+1;"t), where Lt is the amount lent for investment at time t, Rt+1 is the
gross contractual interest rate on the loan that must be paid at time t + 1, and
"t is the probability that an application to the contract is accepted. In the event
of success, entrepreneurs pay back the amount borrowed adjusted by the interest
factor. Otherwise, they default and the bank gets nothing.
Denition 1 implies that the expected prot that individual j 2 Jt obtains
from applying to loan contract (Lt;Rt+1;"t) is
jt(Lt;Rt+1;"t) = "tpj [qt+1  A  I   Rt+1  Lt]+[wt   "t(I   Lt)]rt+1, (4)
which reects that: (i) the equilibrium contract may or may not require the
entrepreneur to invest her wealth in the project and; (ii) it is always possible to
become a saver if a loan application is denied.9
Since competition among banks is usually crucial in determining the types
of contracts that are oered in equilibrium, it is important to specify how we
9Alternatively, we could have considered contracts in which banks charge an application
fee that is lost by the applicant in the event that the loan is denied. It can be shown that, as
under our current assumptions, also in that case the equilibrium would entail pooling of all
applicants in a single equilibrium contract.
7model it. We follow the traditional model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and
model competition in the credit market as a two-stage game of screening. In
the rst stage, banks design a menu of loan contracts and, in the second stage,
individuals that want to become entrepreneurs apply to the contract that they
nd most attractive. We focus throughout in symmetric equilibria, in which
each bank gets the same share of total deposits and, if they design the same
contract, they get the same share and composition of loan applications.10
3. Equilibria in the closed economy
The driving force of our economy lies in the production of capital and hence
in the functioning of credit markets. These markets are in turn characterized
by competition among banks, which strive to design contracts that attract the
economy's most productive entrepreneurs. We want to characterize the equilib-
rium of this competitive process in the benchmark case of pure adverse selection
and also in the more general case in which adverse selection interacts with lim-
ited pledgeability. Let (b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt) be the contract to which individual j
applies in equilibrium. A rst characteristic that arises immediately is that, in
any equilibrium, individuals invest all of their own wealth in the project if they
choose to become entrepreneurs.11 It therefore follows that b Ljt = b Lt = I   wt
for all j 2 [0;1]. Taking this into account, there are three conditions that any
equilibrium must satisfy:
1. Entrepreneurial participation constraint, which guarantees that individ-
uals choose to become entrepreneurs and apply to loan contracts only if
the return of doing so exceeds that of being a depositor in the banking
system. Formally,
jt(b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt)  rt+1wt () pj[qt+1AI  b Rjt+1(I wt)]  rt+1wt,
(5)
for all j  b pt.12 There are two important implications of Equation (5)
for what follows. First, it shows that the participation constraint does
not depend directly on the probability of loan acceptance "jt: this follows
because the expected payo of applying to a loan jt(b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt) is
10Our banks thus design contracts and compete strategically through screening. The analy-
sis would remain essentially unchanged if, at the cost of additional notation, we replaced these
banks with competitive markets as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Taddei (2010).
11Under asymmetric information, this follows because banks have an incentive to attract
higher quality individuals by designing contracts that require them to invest more of their
own wealth in the project. Hence, the only equilibrium is one in which all individual wealth
is invested in the project. In the absence of asymmetric information, this is inconsequential
because individuals are indierent between investing their own wealth in the project and
investing borrowed funds.
12In a setting with uncertainty, the participation constraint at time t would be a function
of the expected return to capital at time t + 1: in our environment, there is perfect foresight
and hence the participation constraint depends directly on qt+1. Naturally, the addition of
uncertainty to our economy would be straightforward since all individuals are risk neutral.
8simply an average between the payo of the loan itself and the payo of
becoming a saver. Second, Equation (5) shows that whenever individual
j wishes to become an entrepreneur in equilibrium, so does any individual
jwith j> j. This implies that any equilibrium must entail a marginal
investor, denoted by b pt, which is dened as the least productive individual
that wishes to become an entrepreneur and applies for credit in period t.
2. Bank zero-prot condition, which requires banks to break even in equi-
librium. Formally, noting that
1 Z
b pt
b "jt  dj represents the total amount of




b "jt  j  b Rjt+1
 dj




b "jt  dj. (6)
Equation (6) says that banks must break even on their aggregate loan
portfolio in equilibrium, even though it does not rule out the possibility
that they make losses on some specic loans. This condition follows di-
rectly from the observation that, if there were positive prots made in
equilibrium, a bank could deviate protably by designing slightly more
attractive contracts that would attract all entrepreneurs.
3. Market clearing constraint, which guarantees that the supply of savings
is matched by an equal internal demand for investment. This condition,
which also depends on the productivity of the marginal investor, can be
expressed as follows:
(I   wt) 
1 Z
b pt
b "jt  dj = (1  
1 Z
b pt
b "jt  dj)  wt. (7)
Any equilibrium of our economy must therefore satisfy Equations (5)-(7),
which jointly determine the triple fb pt;rt+1;qt+1g.13 We now characterize these
equilibria, beginning with the benchmark case of frictionless credit markets. We
then turn to the case of adverse selection and study its interaction with limited
pledgeability.
3.1. The frictionless economy
In the absence of frictions, the equilibrium of our economy is straightforward.
Banks can observe the type of each potential borrower and equilibrium contracts
are thus given by (b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt) = (I wt;
rt+1
pj
;1) for all applicants j 2 [b pt;1].
13Note that qt+1 is a function of kt+1 and it is therefore fully determined by the identity
of the marginal investor b pt and the distribution of loan acceptance rates f"jtgj in[b pt;1].
9Banks break even on each type of contract and Equation (6) becomes pjRjt+1 =
rt+1 for j 2 [b pt;1]. Moreover, there is no rationing and b "jt = 1 for j 2 [b pt;1].14
Given these contracts, the identity of the marginal investor b pt follows directly








In the absence of nancial frictions, only those projects that yield a rate of
return that is higher than the interest rate are undertaken in equilibrium, i.e.
those projects for which pjqt+1A  rt+1. By increasing the opportunity cost of
becoming an entrepreneur, higher interest rates on deposits raise the threshold
productivity b pt and lower aggregate investment; on the contrary, by increasing
the return of becoming an entrepreneur, a higher future price of capital qt+1 or
productivity of investment A both lower the threshold probability of success b pt
and expand aggregate investment.
Any equilibrium in the credit market must therefore satisfy Equation (8).
But it must also satisfy the market clearing condition of Equation (7) with
b "jt = 1 for j 2 [b pt;1], which yields




Equations (8) and (9) jointly determine the credit-market equilibrium of our
economy, fb pt;rt+1;qt+1g.15 It follows directly that, in equilibrium, the average
productivity of investment at time t is given by







which is decreasing in wages. Intuitively, as the economy grows and wages
increase, so does investment and less productive projects are therefore under-
taken. Equations (8) and (9) also provide the equilibrium interest rate for this
economy:







Finally, the law of motion of capital follows from replacing Equations (3)
and (10) into Equation (1):
kt+1 = A 

1  




 s  k
t , (12)
14Consider that there is an equilibrium with b "jt < 1 for some j 2 (b pt;1]. This means that
some of the applicants would strictly prefer to become entrepreneurs and yet they will only
do so with a probability b "t < 1. But then, a bank could protably deviate to an alternative
contract that simultaneously entails a higher interest rate and a higher acceptance rate.
15Equations (7) and (8) jointly determine b pt and rt+1. Since all loan applications are
accepted, qt+1 is then directly determined by b pt.
10which can be shown to be increasing and concave as long as wages do not exceed
the size of investment projects I, which is clearly the case of interest to us. We
assume that this holds throughout.16
3.2. Adverse selection
Consider now that we modify the previous setup by introducing a friction
in credit markets. In particular, we initially focus on a type of friction that has
allegedly been at the heart of the recent turmoil in nancial markets: adverse
selection. Relative to the model of Section 3.1, the only modication that we
make is to assume that individual j's probability of success is private infor-
mation and is thus unobservable to banks. Because this is the only dimension
along which projects dier from one another, banks will now oer one \pooling"
contract to all applicants so that (b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt) = (b Lt; b Rt+1;b "t) for j 2 Jt.17
In any such equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that all applications
must be accepted, i.e. b "t = 1.18 Since all potential borrowers apply to the
same loan contract, it must also be true that the contractual interest rate b Rt+1
adjusts to reect the average quality of the pool of applicants. If we let b pAS;t
denote the identity of the marginal investor under adverse selection, this implies








1   b pASt
= 2 
rt+1
1 + b pAS;t
(13)
To determine the average quality of the potential applicant, we can replace
this expression in the participation constraint of Equation (5) and solve implic-
itly for b pAS;t:
rt+1 =
b pAS;t  qt+1  A  I
wt + 2 
b pAS;t
1 + b pAS;t
 (I   wt)
. (14)







 (1   )
1
1  .
This comes from considering that the maximum steady-state level of capital of this economy
can never exceed





, and making sure that even at this steady-state wages do
not exceed the size of investment projects I.
17In this sense, our environment is similar to DeMeza and Webb (1987), with the exception
that we allow for "t < 1.
18We have already noted that all contracts must entail the same loan sizes Lt = I   wt.
There remains the possibility, however, that banks try to screen dierent types of individuals
by designing contracts with dierent values of R and ". Since individuals difer only in
their probability of success, it can be shown that banks will always try to attract the most
productive individuals by designing contracts that entail both a higher R and a higher ". In
equilibrium, this means that the pooling contract will entail the highest possible level of ",
i.e. in this case " = 1.
11Equation (14) denes an increasing relationship between b pAS;t and rt+1 that
must be satised in equilibrium. A simple comparison with Equation (8) reveals
that, for given levels of rt+1 and wt, b pAS;t < b pt. All else equal, adverse selection
induces cross-subsidization across dierent borrowers and it therefore provides
incentives for less productive individuals to become entrepreneurs.
Together with the market clearing condition of Equation (7), Equation (14)
determines the credit-market equilibrium of the economy fb pAS;t;rt+1;qt+1g,
which is characterized as follows:19




rt+1 = qt+1  A 
[2I   wt]  [I   wt]
I2 + [I   wt]
2 . (16)
A direct comparison of Equations (7) and (9) reveals that b pAS;t = b pt, so that
adverse selection does not aect the equilibrium productivity of investment in
the closed economy. This follows from two special features of our model: (i)
since savings are inelastic, investment must equal the economy's labor income
at all times, regardless of whether there is adverse selection or not, and; (ii)
since projects are of xed size and all loan applications are accepted, the order




of the most productive individuals. Adverse selection therefore
does not aect the law of motion of the capital stock, which is still given by
Equation (12). Although none of our qualitative results depend on it, we believe
that this is an appealing feature of our model because it will allow us to isolate
(i) the economic eects of the interaction between adverse selection and limited
pledgeability, which we address in Section 3.4, and; (ii) the economic eects of
adverse selection under nancial integration, which we address in Section 4.
But how is it that, despite the presence of adverse selection, we nd that
b pAS;t = b pt so that no individuals with pj < b pAS;t are tempted to become en-
trepreneurs? The answer, as can be seen by comparing Equations (11) and (16),
is that the equilibrium interest rate increases in order to discourage this type of
entry. Hence, rt+1 > b pAS;tqt+1A and the marginal productivity of investment
lies below the interest rate. The reason is that less productive individuals are ef-
fectively cross-subsidized in by the more productive ones: consequently, for any
given interest rate on deposits, the demand for credit is larger than it would be
in the frictionless economy. In the closed economy, in which total investment
must equal the total wage bill, this leads to an increase in the interest rate in
order to restore equilibrium. This increase in the interest rate relative to the
frictionless economy of Section 3.1 is the sole consequence of adverse selection.20
19As before, since all applications are accepted, qt+1 follows directly from b pAS;t.
20Once again, this result depends on our assumptions regarding the perfectly inelastic supply
of total savings and the xed size of investment projects. If total savings were increasing on
the interest rate, for example, adverse selection would lead to an expansion in the equilibrium
level of investment. If projects did not have a xed size, adverse selection might also aect the
12Real-world nancial markets are not only prone to adverse selection, how-
ever. In many instances, lenders might be reluctant to lend despite being able to
accurately assess the likely return of their borrowers: the reason is simply that
they may nd it hard to enforce repayment ex-post. This type of enforcement
friction is commonly referred to as limited pledgeability, and it arises when bor-
rowers are capable of diverting part of their ex-post resources away from the
reach of creditors.21 Since it is believed to be a good indicator of the quality
of nancial institutions in an economy, limited pledgeability has been used as a
simple way to model the eect of these institutions on macroeconomic outcomes
in general and on capital ows in particular.22 Of course, both adverse selection
and limited pledgeability are prevalent in real nancial markets.23 In this sense,
the analysis of pure adverse selection developed in this section can be seen as
a useful benchmark on which to build the more realistic case of an economy in
which both frictions coexist. Before doing so, we briey return to the economy
of Section 3.1 and use it to recall the standard results of the benchmark case of
pure limited pledgeability.
3.3. Limited pledgeability
To introduce limited pledgeability in the frictionless benchmark we need only
add one more restriction to the equilibrium conditions of Equations (5)-(7): in
the event of default, lenders can seize at most a fraction  2 [0;1] of the resources
of borrowers. This means that any equilibrium contract (b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt)must
also satisfy
b Rjt+1  b Ljt+1 = b Rjt+1  (I   wt)    qt+1  A  I. (17)
Unlike adverse selection, the main eect of limited pledgeability is to reduce
investment. To see this, note that the participation constraint of Equation
(5) is slack whenever the pledgeability constraint of Equation (17) holds with
equality. This implies that some individuals that would invest in the frictionless
equilibrium composition of investment. The main feature of adverse selection that we want to
capture, however, is that it generates cross-subsidization between dierent types of borrowers
thereby fostering overinvestment by unproductive types. In our setup, this would still be true
in equilibrium if we allowed for investment projects of variable size.
21See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001),
Matsuyama (2004), Lorenzoni (2008) and Aoki et al. (2009). This type of friction could arise,
for example, when the borrower's output is unobservable by the lender ex post or when it is
unveriable by a court of law.
22This is true both in the theoretical and in the empirical literature. In the latter, the
quality of nancial institutions is usually proxied with the creditor rights index based on La
Porta et al. (1998). This index, which is the leading \institutional" predictor of credit market
development around the world, measures the powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy and it
essentially reects the ability of these lenders to seize assets in the event of default.
23In fact, although we follow the literature and treat both frictions as independent, it seems
reasonable to think that they often have a common origin. A dysfunctional court system
might give rise to limited pledgeability by being unable to verify a project's outcomes, for
instance, but it might also eectively give rise to adverse selection by being unable to enforce
the specic type of contracts that make it possible to sceen privately informed agents.
13economy cannot do so under limited pledgeability because they cannot commit
to a repayment that would allow the bank to break even. Formally, the identity

















so that b pt > b pt whenever  < 1  
wt
I
and the pledgeability constraint binds.
To determine the credit-market equilibrium of the economy fb pt;rt+1;qt+1g,
we can combine Equation (18) with the market clearing condition of Equation
(7) setting b "jt = 1 for j 2 [b pt;1].24 This immediately delivers that b pt = b pt, so
that limited pledgeability has no eect on the average productivity of projects
that are undertaken. As was the case in the closed economy under adverse
selection, the totality of labor income must be ultimately invested regardless
of the friction.25 Thus, the law of motion of capital is still given by Equation
(12) and limited pledgeability has the only eect of reducing the equilibrium
interest rate, which now fall below the productivity of the marginal investor {
to rt+1 =   qt+1  A { whenever the constraint binds.
3.4. A tale of two frictions
We now extend our analysis of adverse selection to an economy in which
credit markets are also characterized by limited pledgeability as modeled in the
previous section. In this case, any equilibrium contracts must satisfy Equa-
tions (5)-(7) and two additional restrictions: (i) because of adverse selection,
(b Ljt; b Rjt+1;b "jt) = (b Lt; b Rt+1;b "t) for j 2 Jt and all potential borrowers apply to
the same contract, and; (ii) because of limited pledgeability, it must hold that
b Rt+1  (I   wt)    qt+1  A  I. (19)
Condition (i) implies that the contractual interest rate b Rt+1 must adjust
to reect the average quality of the pool of applicants, and the zero prot
condition of banks is given once again by Equation (13). Precisely because all
borrowers face the same contractual terms, condition (ii) has the novelty that
the pledgeability constraint of Equation (19) either binds for all or none of them.
Whether or not this constraint binds in equilibrium depends on the value of
. We can replace Equations (13), (14) and (15) in Equation (19) to establish
that, whenever  
2  (I   wt)2
I2 + (I   wt)2, the constraint is slack and the equilibrium
is as in Section 3.2. If  is lower than this threshold, however, the equilibrium
24As in Section 3.1, it is straightforward to show that all applications must be accepted in
equilibrium (see Footnote 14). The reason, once again, is that the pledgeability constraint
binds only for the marginal investor in equilibrium. Hence, any equilibrium contract with
b "jt < 1 for j 2 (b pASt;1] will be prone to protable deviations by banks.
25This feature of our model, which closely mirrors Matsuyama (2004), is of course due to
the particular set of assumptions that we make (see Footnote 20).
14entails a binding constraint: in this case, letting b pAS;t denote the productivity
of the marginal investor, it follows that b pAS;t < b pAS;t.26 The reason is that if
the pledgeability constraint is not satised in the original equilibrium, banks are
unwilling to extend any loans and the interest rate must decrease. In the pres-
ence of adverse selection, this provides incentives for less productive individuals
to become entrepreneurs and borrow, enlarging the pool of applicants and gen-
erating an excess demand for funds. To attain market clearing, it is therefore
necessary that b "t < 1 in equilibrium. From the market clearing condition of






1   b pAS;t
=
1   b pAS;t
1   b pAS;t
, (20)
which illustrates that the share of loan applications that are accepted is decreas-
ing in the dierence between b pAS;t and b pAS;t, i.e. between the productivity of
the marginal investor in the pure adverse-selection economy and in the economy
with both frictions. Equations (14), (19) and (20) then fully characterize the
equilibrium fb pASt;rt+1;qt+1g
But how is this \rationing" of applicants sustained in equilibrium? After all,
applicants strictly prefer to borrow and become entrepreneurs. This suggests, as
we have argued in previous sections, that banks could make a prot by deviating
to alternative contracts with higher acceptance rates and higher contractual
interest rates. If the pledgeability constraint is binding, though, such deviations
are not feasible because the contractual interest rate cannot be raised beyond
its equilibrium level.
This discussion points to a central implication of our model. In our setup,
adverse selection per se does not have an eect on the law of motion of the
economy. Considered separately, it aects the equilibrium interest rate but not
the productivity of projects that are nanced in equilibrium: one way to think
about this is that it does not aect the order in which projects are nanced.
When it is combined with limited pledgeability, however, this is no longer true.
The combination of both frictions leads to low interest rates and a large and rel-
atively unproductive pool of applicants, with b pAS;t  b pAS;t, a fraction of which
is denied credit in equilibrium. In this sense, limited pledgeability exacerbates
and the eects of adverse selection, reducing the average quality of projects
that are nanced relative to the frictionless economy and thereby slowing down
capital accumulation and growth. Formally, the law of motion is now given by:
kt+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
A 

1 + b pAS;t
2

 s  k
t if  <
2  (I   wt)2
I2 + (I   wt)2
A 

1 + b pAS;t
2

 s  k
t if  
2  (I   wt)2
I2 + (I   wt)2
, (21)
26This follows from replacing Equations (13) and (14) in the constraint of Equation (19),
which delivers the critical value of  as an increasing function of ^ pAS;t. Hence, if the
constraint is violated in the equilibrium of Section 3.2, it must be that ^ pAS;t < ^ pAS;t.
15which lies below the law of motion of Equation (12) as long as the pledgeability
constraint is binding, i.e. for low levels of wages.
This concludes our characterization of the closed economy. Figure 1 below
summarizes our discussion by simulating the dynamic behavior of this economy
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
4. The open economy: capital ows and nancial frictions
We now consider that our economy opens its nancial markets to the rest
of the world, so that individuals j 2 Jt can borrow from and/or lend to the
international nancial market. Throughout, we assume that this market is
willing and able to borrow or lend any amount at an expected gross return of
r. Hence, we restrict the analysis to the case of a small open economy. We
assume throughout that the international nancial market is subject to the same
constraints faced by domestic banks.27
In the closed economy, aggregate investment is constrained by the avail-
ability of domestic resources and the domestic interest rate rt+1 is determined
endogenously. In the open economy, investment can be nanced with foreign
resources and the domestic interest rate equals r. The endogenous variables to
be determined are thus b p
t { where the superscript () indicates that the vari-
able corresponds to the open economy { and qt+1, and equilibrium contracts
need no longer satisfy the market clearing condition of Equation (7). Capital
accumulation, and thus qt+1, follows directly once the value of b p and the loan
acceptance rates b "jt for j 2 [b p
t;1] are determined.
4.1. The frictionless economy
In the absence of nancial frictions, the equilibrium of the open economy is
straightforward. Given the international interest rate r, the level of investment
is immediately determined by the participation constraint and the bank zero








where q denotes the rental price of capital and we have dropped time-subscripts
to reect the fact that there are no state variables in this economy. Equation
27This is in contrast with dierent strands of literature that assume nancial frictions to
be more prevalent in international transactions than in domestic ones. This assumption is
paramount in the literature on sovereign risk, for example, in which governments are assumed
to be opportunistic and they do not value the welfare of foreigners. Dell'Arriccia et al. (1999)
and Giannetti (2003) assume that foreigners are less informed than domestic agents regarding
the quality of local borrowers. In our competitive setting, however, we conjecture that any
informational advantage of domestic agents relative to foreigners would be competed away by
banks.
16(22) illustrates that, in the absence of nancial frictions, capital ows between
the small open economy and the rest of the world until the return to domestic
investment equals the international interest rate. From the perspective of each
generation t, then, total consumption is maximized when capital ows between
them and the international nancial market at time t are unrestricted in any
way.28 Given that b "jt = 1 for j 2 [b p;1], Equation (22) uniquely determines the
value of b p.29 This value is independent of the capital stock kt and depends only
on the international interest rate r _ Hence, the economy converges immediately



















With this benchmark in mind, we now turn to the implications of adverse
selection for capital ows.
4.2. Adverse selection
In our analysis of Section 3.2, we showed that adverse selection boosted
investment by providing unproductive individuals with incentives to become
entrepreneurs. In the closed economy, this eect was completely oset by an
increase in the equilibrium interest, so that the marginal investor was the same
as in the frictionless economy, i.e. b pAS;t = b pt for all t. But how does adverse
selection aect the direction and magnitude of capital ows when the economy
is integrated with the international nancial market?
As before, the restriction imposed by adverse selection is that all borrowers
face the same contractual terms. Taking this into account, Equations (5) and





AS;t  qt+1  A  I
wt + 2 
b p
AS;t
1 + b p
AS;t
 (I   wt)
. (24)
There are two interesting aspects of Equation (24). First, the only variable to
be determined in the expression is ultimately b p
AS;t. This follows because, for
the same reasons outlined in Section 3.2, it must hold in equilibrium that all
applications are accepted (b "

t = 1) and qt+1 is therefore directly determined by
b p
AS;t. Second, it shows that { dierently from the frictionless benchmark of the
28From an intergenerational perspective, however, the issue is more complicated. The reason
is the usual one in this class of models: greater capital accumulation today, even if costly for
the current generation, benets future generations through higher wages. Although certainly
interesting, a full analysis of welfare implications would exceed the scope of this paper and we
therefore leave it for future research.
29If all loan applications are accepted, q is immediately determined by b p. Moreover, we
know from our discussion of the closed economy that this will be the case in equilibrium (see
Footnote 14).
17previous section { the identity of the marginal investor b p
AS;t is not independent
of kt and dynamics are therefore inuenced by the state of the economy. The
reason, of course, is that the capital stock aects wages and thus the incentive of
individuals to become entrepreneurs. In particular, dierentiation of Equation
(24) reveals that there is an increasing relationship between b p
AS;t and wt, so
that total investment is decreasing in the economy's capital stock. It follows












behaves as in Figure 2 below.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The thick line in Figure 2 illustrates a representative law of motion for the
capital stock in the small open economy with adverse selection. In the gure,
k denotes the steady-state level of capital in the absence of nancial frictions.
Two important features stand out: (i) the law of motion lies everywhere above
the corresponding law of motion for the frictionless economy, and; (ii) it is
downward-sloping.30 We now discuss each of these features separately.
By fostering the cross-subsidization of less productive individuals, adverse
selection exacerbates investment. In the closed economy, we have seen how this
increase in investment can be counterbalanced by an increase in the equilibrium
interest rate. In the open economy, in which the interest rate is given and equals
r, there is no such countervailing force. Relative to the frictionless economy,
therefore, the adverse selection economy displays the higher levels of investments
and of capital inows. This explains why the law of motion lies everywhere above
k so that, if we let k
AS denote the steady-state level of capital in this economy,
it must necessarily hold that k
AS > k as depicted in the gure. This implies
that, because of adverse selection, the marginal return to investment in the open
economy is lower than the international interest rate. Although this might be
good for future generations that benet from arriving to an economy with more
capital, it is certainly harmful for the generation that invests in projects yielding
a rate of return below r. Consequently, from the perspective of generation t,
aggregate consumption would be maximized by raising the domestic interest
rate at time t so as to eliminate these investments.31 A government with the
30On the horizontal axis, the gure depicts values of kt for which wt < I, so that the adverse
selection problem is binding throughout. Once this ceases to be the case, the law of motion
naturally coincides with that of the frictionless economy.
31For a given capital stock kt, the total consumption of generation t can be expressed as
follows:
ct+1 =   (kt+1)   r 
h
(1   b p
AS;t)  I   s  (kt)
i
,
where: kt+1 is a function of b p
AS;t as in Equation (25); the rst term represents the total
capital income of the economy in period t+1, and; the second term represents the net interest
payments made to the international nancial market at time t + 1. Since b p
AS;t < r in
18ability to levy taxes could implement this through a tax on domestic investment
or, equivalently, a tax on capital inows.
The second important feature of the law of motion depicted in Figure 2
is that it is downward sloping. Once again, this follows from the observation
that b p
AS;t is increasing in wt. When the capital stock and wages are low,
less productive individuals have a strong incentive to become entrepreneurs:
since they need to borrow most of the investment from banks, they will be
heavily cross-subsidized by the more productive individuals. As the capital
stock and wages increase, however, the extent of cross-subsidization decreases
and entrepreneurship loses its appeal for less productive individuals. This raises
b p
AS;t, depressing investment and capital accumulation.
This last discussion points to an crucial implication of adverse selection in the
context of a small open economy: it exacerbates economic volatility. Whereas in
nancial autarky the economy converges monotonically to its steady state, the
open economy necessarily displays oscillatory behavior.32 The reason, of course,
is the same as before. When wages are low, so is b p
AS;t and total investment is
therefore high. In this case, even individuals with relatively low productivity are
attracted by the extent of cross-subsidization oered by large loan sizes I  wt.
This surge in investment increases the future capital stock and wages, though,
which eventually discourages investment by unproductive individuals and brings
about a reduction in output that restarts the economic cycle.33
We have thus designed a model in which adverse selection has no real eects
under nancial autarky. When individuals are allowed to borrow from and/or
lend to the international nancial market, however, the picture is drastically
dierent. Adverse selection exacerbates investment, capital inows and capital
accumulation and, even in the absence of any type of uncertainty, it generates
volatility.34 This provides a simple benchmark that can be contrasted with the
one typically explored in the literature, that of pure limited pledgeability. We
briey summarize it below before turning to the more realistic case in which
both frictions interact.
equilibrium, maximization of ct+1 requires eectively raising the domestic interest rate above
r so as to reduce domestic capital accumulation and decrease net interest payments to the
international nancial market.
32The steady state k
AS can in principle be either stable or unstable. The economy might
display uctuations in both cases.
33To interpret this result, it is best to think of a period in our model not as representing
one half of the life of a generation but rather as the average length of a nancial contract. A
more realistic model, in which agents lived for many periods, would generate an endogenous
distribution of wealth and adverse selection would be more prevalent among individuals with
lower wealth levels. We conjecture that, in such a model, the types of cycles analyzed here
could still arise as long as those individuals represent a suciently high fraction of economic
activity.
34It is important to stress that the existence of these cycles in the presence of adverse
selection does not rely on investment projects having a xed size. In a closely related setting,
Martin (2008) shows how similar cycles may arise in an environment in which the size of
projects is variable.
194.3. Limited pledgeability
Under limited pledgeability, b p
;t is determined by Equation (18) plus the
restriction that rt+1 = r.35 As in the case of adverse selection, then, the
identity of the marginal investor b p
;t is not independent of kt and dynamics are
inuenced by the state of the economy. The reason is clear: through its eect on
wages, the capital stock aects the leverage of investors and thus the tightness
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which is illustrated in Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The thick line in Figure 3 illustrates a representative law of motion for the
capital stock in the small open economy under limited pledgeability. The gure,
in which k denotes the capital stock at which the pledgeability constraint ceases
to bind, depicts the case of an economy that has one steady state k
 in which
investment is constrained. The gure reproduces two features of this law of
motion that are commonplace in the literature: (i) as long as the pledgeability
constraint is binding, the law of motion lies everywhere below the corresponding
law of motion for the frictionless economy, and; (ii) the law of motion is upward-
sloping.36
When   1  
wt
I
, the pledgeability constraint is slack and Equation (26)
coincides with the law of motion of the frictionless economy. When  < 1  
wt
I
, the pledgeability constraint binds, the economy underinvests relative to
the frictionless economy and its law of motion lies below k. By preventing
some investments that yield a return above r, limited pledgeability reduces
the aggregate consumption of the generation that is exposed to it. From the
35Once again, since we know that all applications are accepted in equilibrium, qt+1 follows
directly from b p
t.
36Figure 2 illustrates the law of motion as being strictly concave, which need not be the
case. Intuitively, there are two opposing forces that determine the shape of the law of motion:
(i) the diminishing marginal productivity of investment and capital, which makes the law of
motion concave, and; (ii) the relaxation of the pledgeability constraint as capital and wages
increase, which makes the law of motion convex. The exact shape of the law of motion depends
on the relative strength of these two forces, which may give rise to multiple steady states in
this small-open economy. For a thorough discussion of this point in a related model, see
Matsuyama (2004).
20perspective of generation t, total consumption would thus be maximized by
lowering the domestic interest rate at time t below r.37 A government with
the ability to subsidize could implement this through a subsidy on domestic
investment or, equivalently, a subsidy on capital inows.38 Figure 2 also shows
that, whenever the pledgeability constraint is binding, the law of motion is
upward sloping and the economy does not converge immediately to the steady
state. In this range, increases in the capital stock relax borrowing constraints,
thereby reducing b p
;t and boosting investment.
This discussion summarizes, in a nutshell, the most common results of the
literature on nancial frictions and international capital ows. As captured by a
binding pledgeability constraint, a low quality of nancial institutions tends to
restrict investment. In a closed economy, this reduces the equilibrium interest
rate. In an open economy, this expands capital outows (or reduces inows)
relative to the frictionless benchmark. This type of mechanism has been invoked
to account for the seeming inability of developing economies to attract capital
ows despite the high returns to capital accumulation in many of them: the
short answer is that the quality of their nancial institutions (i.e. their ) is
low.39 A similar mechanism underlies the \asymmetric nancial development"
view of global imbalances, according to which the large recent capital ows out
of many Asian economies (predominantly China) are due to the inability of these
economies of supplying nancial assets, i.e. of translating a high productivity
of physical investment into a high return for lenders.40
4.4. A tale of two frictions: capital ows in the open economy
The benchmarks of pure adverse selection and pure limited pledgeability
are particular cases of the more realistic environment in which both frictions
interact. To analyze this case, we return to the economy with adverse selection
of Section 4.2 and impose a pledgeability constraint like the one in Equation
(19). In equilibrium, the identity of the marginal investor is still determined by
Equation (24), which makes sure that the participation constraint and the bank
zero prot condition are jointly satised. By replacing this last condition and
the contractual interest rate of Equation (13) into the pledgeability constraint,
37The analysis in this case is the mirror image of the one carried out for the adverse-selection
economy (see Footnote 31).
38Clearly, the convenience of adopting such a subsidy depends on the cost of taxation. We
assume here that the government can tax lump-sum.
39See, for example, Gertler and Rogo (1990) and Boyd and Smith (1997), among others.
Of course, private contracting frictions between borrowers and lenders are not the only reason
for which these countries might fail to attract capital, and it is commonly believed that
opportunistic behavior by the government plays a substantial role as well. Broner and Ventura
(2010) provide a recent view along these lines, while Gennaioli et al.(2010) develop a model
in which the government's incentives to behave opportunistically are aected by the tightness
of private pledgeability constraints.
40Caballero et al. (2008) provide a theoretical framework along these lines.




2  (I   wt)   (2I   wt)
, (27)
where b p
AS;t denotes the productivity of the marginal investor.
There are two possible types of equilibria in this economy. The rst type
arises when the pledgeability constraint is slack and it coincides with the equi-
librium of Section 4.2, i.e. b p
AS;t = b p
AS;t. As can be seen from Equation (27),
this equilibrium is more likely to arise when  and wt are high and when r (and
thus, b p
AS;t) is low. The second type of equilibrium arises when the pledgeability
constraint is binding. In this case, Equation (27) holds with equality and the
productivity of the marginal investor b p
AS;t lies below that of the Section 4.2,
i.e. b p
AS;t < b p
AS;t. The reason for this is similar to the one discussed in the
context of a closed economy. If the pledgeability constraint is violated, banks
are unwilling to extend loans, reducing investment and raising the marginal
product of capital in the economy. This increase in the return to investment
makes it possible to satisfy the pledgeability constraint but, because of adverse
selection, it also provides incentives for less productive individuals to become
entrepreneurs and apply for loans. Ultimately, the equilibrium is characterized
by a large pool of potential borrowers and a low level of investment, which are
reconciled through a low probability of obtaining a loan, i.e. b "t < 1. In this
case, rationing of applicants is consistent with equilibrium because a binding
pledgeability constraint prevents banks from designing protable deviations.
This discussion enables us to characterize the dynamics of the economy. If
the limited pledgeability constraint is to bind anywhere, it will do so when
the capital stock and wages are low.41 In this range, b p
AS;t is determined by
Equation (27) with an equality and b "t is then obtained so as to satisfy the
pledgeability constraint of Equation (19). The resulting law of motion of the
economy is given by
kt+1 =
8
> > > <
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where the conditions on  simply restate Equation (27). An example of Equation
(28) is depicted graphically in Figure 4 below.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
41This follows directly from analyzing the pledgeability constraint of Equation (19). We
have established that b p
ASt increases with the capital stock: hence, as the capital stock grows
and wt increases, investment falls and qt+1 rises. Increases in the capital stock thus relax the
constraint, so that if it is slack for a capital stock k it must also be slack for all capital stocks
k0 > k.
22The thick line in Figure 4 illustrates a representative law of motion for the
capital stock in the small open economy with adverse selection and pledgeability
constraints. The economy depicted in the gure has a unique steady state,
denoted by k
AS, in which the pledgeability constraint is no longer binding.
Two important features stand out: (i) as long as the pledgeability constraint
is binding, the law of motion lies everywhere below the corresponding law of
motion for the pure adverse-selection economy, and; (ii) the law of motion is
non-monotonic.
We have already argued that a binding pledgeability constraint reduces the
production of capital. It might be therefore tempting to think that, by doing so,
it is actually helpful to mitigate the overinvestment induced by adverse selection.
In fact, it only makes things worse. By limiting the contractual interest rate that
can be charged on loans, limited pledgeability provides even greater incentives
for inecient individuals to become entrepreneurs. Thus, just as we found for
the case of the closed economy, limited pledgeability exacerbates the eects of
adverse selection and it leads to a fall in the average productivity of investment.
Although a binding pledgeability constraint does limit investment relative to
the pure adverse-selection economy, it does so randomly through rationing and
not selectively by weeding out unproductive individuals.
The second important feature of the law of motion depicted in Figure 4 is
that it is non-monotonic. When the economy's capital stock is low and the
pledgeability constraint is binding, the law of motion is upward sloping. This
happens even though, in this region, increases in the capital stock and wages
raise the productivity of the marginal investor b p
AS;t.42 But this reduction in
the pool of potential borrowers decreases the need for equilibrium rationing and,
ultimately, it is this fall in rationing what dominates and makes kt+1 increasing
in kt. To see this formally, we can replace b p
AS;t from Equation (27) into





2  (I   wt)   (2I   wt)
I    (1   )
. (29)
Equation (29) illustrates that, as the capital stock and wages increase, qt+1 must
fall. This means that the production of capital rises along with the capital stock,
so that as the pool of potential borrowers decreases the loan acceptance rate
increases more than proportionately. Once the pledgeability constraint ceases
to bind and rationing disappears altogether, the law of motion coincides with
that of Section 4.2 and it becomes downward-sloping.
The introduction of limited pledgeability therefore enriches the dynamic ef-
fects of adverse selection as characterized in Section 4.2. First, it slows down
capital accumulation not by mitigating the eects of adverse selection for over-
investment, but rather by exacerbating them to bring about a decrease in the
average productivity of investment. From the perspective of generation t, in
42This follows directly from Equation (27), which holds with equality when the pledgeability
constraint binds.
23fact, we conjecture that the maximization of total consumption requires a sub-
sidy to the savings of domestic individuals. By raising the interest rate paid on
deposits beyond r, such a subsidy mitigates limited pledgeability and adverse
selection by providing unproductive individuals with greater incentives to be-
come savers. As these individuals leave the pool of applicants, the contractual
interest rate charged on loans drops and the pledgeability constraint is relaxed
as well. Eventually, this policy can raise the identity of the marginal investor
from b p
AS;t to b p
AS;t and nally to b p
t.43
A second innovation relative to the adverse selection benchmark of Section
4.2 is that the introduction of limited pledgeability can give rise to multiple
steady states.44 Of these steady states, only one can lie on the downward-sloping
part of the law of motion in Figure 3. This implies that institutional reforms
that increase  shift the economy's law of motion upwards and they eventually
eliminate all steady states but k
AS. In this case, improvements in institutional
quality relax borrowing constraints until, in the long run, the pledgeability
constraint ceases to bind and the only remaining friction is adverse selection.
These increases in  expand leverage and enhance the productivity of investment
but, due to the oscillatory nature of k
AS, they must also fuel economic volatility
in the long-run.
This concludes our characterization of the small open economy. Figure 5
below summarizes our discussion by simulating how, starting from a common
initial condition, this economy evolves over time under dierent scenarios.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The discussion of this section highlights two important implications of our
model. The rst is that the development of nancial markets, as well as the set of
policies aimed at improving their eciency, is not necessarily one-dimensional.
When both frictions are present, for example, we have seen how they com-
plement one another: this means that, to improve the allocation of resources,
policies that improve creditor rights might be just as useful as policies designed
to deal with adverse selection, i.e. that lower the cost of screening borrowers.
The relative eciency of dierent policies, however, might vary according to the
level of economic development. A second and related implication is precisely
that some of the problems associated to adverse selection might surface only
when the economy surpasses a certain level of wealth or nancial development.
During the recent nancial crisis, for example, economists were taken aback by
the diculties faced by the seemingly developed nancial markets of the United
States. How could it be that these markets had done such a poor job of allo-
cating credit? Our model highlights that some of these problems, like excessive
investment and the resulting volatility associated with it, can only arise precisely
where nancial markets surpass a minimum level of economic development. In
43Once again, we are assuming throughout that the government can nance these subsidies
by taxing lump-sum.
44See Footnote 36.
24a world in which a substantial fraction of economies are characterized by poor
nancial institutions, it may well be that the economy where these institutions
work best will end up being most visibly aected by the problems of adverse
selection.45
5. Concluding Remarks
The nancial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse se-
lection in nancial markets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroe-
conomic models of nancial frictions, however, which have focused almost exclu-
sively on the eects of limited pledgeability. In this paper, we have attempted to
ll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection. Our
main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:
(i) leads to an increase in the economy's equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it
generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the
equilibrium interest rate. We have shown how, under nancial integration, these
eects translate into excessive capital inows and generate endogenous uctua-
tions in the capital stock and output. We have also extended our model to the
more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist,
and we have concluded that there is a sense in which both frictions complement
one another: if anything, limited pledgeability exacerbates the consequences of
adverse selection on the macroeconomy.
Our analysis is incomplete in two important respects. The rst one is that
we have stopped short of characterizing the full welfare implications of adverse
selection and limited pledgeability. Instead, we have referred exclusively to the
contemporaneous eects of these frictions on each generation of savers that is
exposed to them. This shortcoming of our analysis is not due to lack of interest
on our behalf. As we mentioned in the main body of the text, a full welfare
analysis is quite involved because it requires the balancing of dierent eects
across generations. There is simply no space for this here.
A second and related shortcoming is that we have restricted our analysis of
nancial integration to the case of a small open economy. Doing so has been
instrumental to simplify the analysis and it has allowed us to portray the eects
of adverse selection and limited pledgeability in a very clear manner. It has
also, however, prevented us from using the model to directly address the recent
turn of events. The prevailing view on global imbalances and nancial frictions
is that limited pledgeability has been at the heart of capital ows between Asia
and the United States. According to this view, the United States has only stood
45Imagine, for example, that the world is made up of two economies like the one analyzed
in this section, one of which is characterized by a low level of . Under nancial integration,
capital in this world will tend to ow towards the economy with the most developed markets,
which will receive them as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, these inows will be benecial
because they will lower the cost of nancing and allow for an expansion in the capital stock;
on the other hand, they may also be costly by fueling inecient investments and economic
volatility.
25to gain from these inows. How is this view aected once the importance of
adverse selection is acknowledged? Is it possible that, through their eects on
the interest rate, these capital inows exacerbate adverse selection and lead to
inecient investment in the United States? Can the United States ultimately
suer a welfare loss if the rest of the world uses its nancial system to interme-
diate resources? Addressing these questions should be the exciting next step in
this research agenda.
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Figure 1: Capital accumulation under nancial autarky (A = 1, I = 1,  = 0:3,  = 0:3)
29Figure 2: Dynamics of kt with adverse selection
Figure 3: Dynamics of kt with limited pledgeability




































Figure 5: Capital accumulation in the small open economy (A = 1, I = 1,  = 0:3,  = 0:3)
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